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aBStract
As is well known, the UK, Ireland and Sweden opened their labour markets 
already at the time of the accession of the eight East-European Member 
States i .e . on May 1, 2004 . The main objective of the article is to examine free 
circulation of labour five years after the first round of EU enlargement . Although 
the second round of 2007 brought about also important changes, time is too 
short to analyse their trends . Therefore, the main focus is on immigration 
pattern of the 8 East-European Member States to those destinations, where 
as a result of their ‘open door policy’, the inflow was substantial, i .e . Ireland 
and the UK . Up to 2007 major impact on overall labour market outcomes 
in the host economies could not be found (for example, Irish data confirmed 
that in the first years of 2000s immigration was primarily demand-driven) . It 
remains to be seen, however, what the impacts of the current economic and 
financial crisis would be . Whereas it seems likely that the inflow would decline, 
the impacts on the composition of migrants are still unclear .
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reSumen
Como es bien sabido, Reino Unido, Irlanda y Suecia abrieron sus mercados 
de trabajo a la vez que se producía la ampliación de la UE a los ocho nuevos 
estados miembros, es decir, el 1 de mayo de 2004 . El principal objetivo de 
este artículo es analizar la libre circulación de trabajadores cinco años después 
de la primera ronda de ampliación de la UE . Aunque la segunda ronda de 2007 
también produjo importantes cambios, ha pasado muy poco tiempo para poder 
analizar sus consecuencias . Por ello, nos centramos en el patrón de emigración 
de los ocho nuevos estados miembros, destacando como destinos Reino 
Unido e Irlanda, debido a su “política de puertas abiertas” . Desde 2007 no se 
observan grandes impactos en el mercado de trabajo de los países receptores 
(por ejemplo, los datos de Irlanda confirman que durante los primeros años 
del 2000 la inmigración fue principalmente fruto de la demanda) . Aún queda 
por ver, sin embargo, cuáles serán los efectos de la actual crisis económica y 
financiera . Aunque parece que el flujo de inmigrantes decrece, los cambios en 
la composición de las migraciones aún no están claros .
Palabras clave: Migraciones de la fuerza de trabajo; Ampliación al Este de 
la UE .
JEL Classification: J61 .
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1 . introduction
Before Central and East-European countries (CEEC) joined the European 
Union in 2004, in the EU15 there had been widespread fears of large inflow 
of workforce from these new members . Although various research studies 
confirmed that this would not happen (some commissioned by EU decision-
makers, see for example: Boeri and Brücker, 2001), a 7-year transition period 
was introduced, similarly to previous arrangements when less developed 
countries joined the EU (in the case of the Mediterranean countries, in the 
80s) . Nonetheless, some countries of the EU15 opened their labour markets 
already at the time of the accession of the eight East-European Member States 
i .e . on May 1, 2004 . These were the UK, Ireland and Sweden (especially the 
former two are well known of their deregulated labour markets) . Over the 
past five years since the accession most countries followed their examples, 
and only two, Austria and Germany apply still restrictions . In light of the fact 
that for the majority of migrants from these East-European countries Austria 
and Germany were destination countries, the fears from mass migration after 
opening is understandable . (Even those papers which did not foresee large 
influx, acknowledged that some regions of Austria and Germany, especially 
those neighbouring with one of the East European members, could be over- 
proportionally affected by free movement of labour within the enlarged EU) .
As shown below, East-European workers have not flooded the ‘old’ members’ 
labour markets after the accession of 2004 . Some authors have, however, 
concluded that “actual migration flows have increased more than was expected 
in the UK and Ireland while the inflow was less than expected in Sweden” . (Zaiceva 
et al ., 2008:11)1 . Large inflow into these countries may have contributed to the 
fact that even those which pursued an “open door” policy in 2004 (Ireland and 
the UK) proved more cautious when Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007: they 
apply certain “restrictions with simplifications”2 . Initially, apart from Sweden, 
1 For example, in the UK, an inflow of about half a million was expected . Instead, according to 
estimates, around 1 million persons entered the UK labour market (although officials figures, derived 
from registration, are also available and show the same order of magnitude .
2 See: Overview on Policies towards the New Member States, European Commission, May, 2009.
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only Finland (which had lifted its restrictions towards NMS 8 after 2004) kept 
its labour market open also towards the two new East-European members . From 
2009 on, however, four other countries have joined this open door policy (out of 
the EU15) . Therefore, Bulgarian and Romanian nationals have also a free access 
to labour markets in Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal .
The main objective of the paper is to examine free circulation of labour . 
After five years of the first wave of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, the trends 
are of particular importance . Due to the short period since the second wave 
of enlargement, the trends can only be examined in the case of the NMS 8 
countries . Therefore the main focus is on their immigration pattern to those 
destinations, where as a result of their ‘open door policy’, the inflow was 
substantial, i .e . Ireland and the UK . Although the main characteristics will be 
examined in some detail only in the case of these host countries, it is important 
to see a more general picture of the scale of inflow also to other countries and 
to investigate more recent developments, including also the mobility direction 
of nationals of the two newest member states .
Therefore, first a general overview is given, based on some recent data, 
then characteristics of labour flows are to be described in the case of NMS 8 
countries, later key motives of migrants will be discussed and finally the most 
topical issues for policy will be presented in order to draw some conclusions 
at the end . 
2 . main trendS and patternS of laBour miGration within the enlarGed eu
As is well known, free circulation of labour (and persons in general) constitutes 
one of the core values of the European Union (and this has been so since its 
foundation in the late 50s) . Despite this, although mobility has undoubtedly 
increased as a result of the two most recent waves of enlargement, if it is 
compared to that in the United States3, it has remained relatively low . Previously, 
around 2% of the EU labour force worked in another Member State, after the 
two waves of enlargement, this figure stands at 2 .4% (Eurostat, Labour Force 
Survey of 2007) . This figure, however, does not include those migrants who 
are not registered (for example, in the UK) and other measurement problems4 
also arise . Undoubtedly, language diversity in Europe plays an important role 
in explaining the difference . Although this barrier is generally acknowledged in 
the literature, much less attention is focused on cultural differences between 
3 In the US, 32% of the population was born outside of the state where (s)he currently lives . At the 
same time, according to findings by the Eurobarometer survey of 2005, only 4% of respondents 
(EU25) have ever lived in another country . Hubert Krieger, however, rightly points out that “due 
to different settings within larger EU Member States, it may [ . . .] be more appropriate to compare 
interstate mobility in the US with the percentage of the EU population that has ever lived in a different 
state or a different larger region within a Member State . For 2005, Eurobarometer shows a figure 
of 21% of the EU25 population” (Krieger, 2008) . So according to more comparable figures, the 
difference is lower . 
4 For example, it is a dilemma how to include temporary and/or seasonal migrants .
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the individual Member States in the EU, which could be much larger than 
interstate differences in the US .
In most EU member states the majority of foreign labour is derived from 
non-EU nationals . This has an important effect even on intra-EU labour flow . 
Whereas NMS account for more than one third out of the aforementioned 
2.4% of EU nationals working outside their home countries (i.e. 0.9%), share of 
non-EU nationals stands at a much higher level, being 3 .7% . (Source: Eurostat, 
Labour Force Survey, 2007) . 
Dominant presence of non-EU nationals in most EU member states is due 
to geographical, historical and other reasons . Undoubtedly, post-colonial ties 
play an outstanding role . They are still very strong both in the case of the major 
traditional destination countries, like the UK and France, and also in the newly 
emerging receiving countries, mainly in Spain . In the case of the UK, this is 
reflected in the still heavy inflow of Commonwealth citizens, mainly from India, 
whereas in the case of Spain, large inflow from Latin America shows this (for 
example cooperation within the framework of Mercosur illustrates the strong 
relationship) . In the case of Spain, it is this recent large inflow (also from North 
Africa) which largely explains why East-European migration, even if it was quite 
considerable, had a relatively smaller impact on the composition of migrants 
than in other receiving countries (for example in Ireland) . Italy’s case is similar 
because it is also recently affected by large inflow from South America and 
North Africa . (In Italy, the four main groups of migrants are East-Europeans, 
Latin-American, Asian and North-African citizens) . 
If, however, the investigation is restricted purely to effects of the two waves 
of recent enlargement, it is clear that they are undoubtedly significant not only 
in Ireland and the UK but also in Spain and Italy (see Table 1) . Whereas the 
two former have become important destination countries for East-European 
labour as a result of mainly the first wave of enlargement, Spain and Italy are 
receiving countries of nationals from the countries of the second wave (mainly 
Romania) . According to data5, more than 70% of net inflow from NMS 8 has 
been received by Ireland and the UK since the accession, whereas Italy and 
Spain absorbed 80% of net migration flows from the second wave countries 
(i .e . NMS 2) since the early 2000s .
Within the context of the migratory consequences of Eastern enlargement, 
it is interesting to see the example of a traditional receiving country, the UK . 
According to its National Insurance data (NINO), where not only employees, 
but also self-employed are included, before the accession even Poland has not 
appeared among the top ten countries of origin (see Table A1) . Later, however, 
from 2004/2005 it has jumped to the first place, preceeding such traditionally 
very important labour exporting countries to the UK, like India and Pakistan . 
Since then Poland has not only retained its position, but other Central and 
East-European members have also joined the group of the top ten . They 
include Slovakia, Lithuania, and from 2007/2008 on, Romania as well . Latvia 
5 See: IAB-presentation .
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also appeared among the top ten, but only once, in 2005/2006 . Since the 
accession, Poland has even strengthened its first place: whereas in 2004/2005 
the number of those adults who entered the UK from this country was just 
almost double of that of the second on the list, India, in the subsequent years 
the inflow of Polish nationals was about four times higher . 
In Ireland, the national composition of migrants from the most important 
Central and East-European sending countries is very similar: according to the 
Irish Central Statistics Office (census of 2006) 6, Poles, Lithuanians (and also 
Latvians) belonged to the 10 largest nationality groups living in Ireland . As 
regards direct effects of the enlargement, their importance is shown by the 
fact that over 44% of citizens of countries which joined the EU in 2004 came 
to Ireland in 2005 or later (see: CSO, 2008) .
It is remarkable that a small country, Lithuania ranks among the top ten 
countries of origin both in the UK and Ireland . Indeed, already in 2005 (i .e . 
just one year after the accession), it had especially high share of taking up 
work abroad: with 3 .5% of active working age population, it is an NMS where 
propensity to migrate seems to be the highest . (Even in the case of Poles the 
respective figure was 2 .1% whereas 2% for Slovakia, which is also an important 
sending country, as shown below) . 
2 .1 . current Situation and trendS
When the current situation is examined, it has to be taken into account that 
two such countries joined in 2007, which have quite high migration potential 
(because of the sheer size of its population in the case of Romania, low GDP 
per capita especially compared to EU15 in both countries, and recent large 
emigration waves from Bulgaria) . First a snapshot on the scale of migration 
from Eastern European Members is presented (based on the most recent 
available data), and the trends are described later . 
As seen from Table 1, share of non-nationals in employment of the EU15 
has become highly diversified by 2007: it ranges between 15 .6% (Ireland)7 
and 1 .4% (Finland) . (Luxemburg is not taken into account because this is 
a special case) . Presence of labour from the New Member States (NMS) is 
evident, though it varies by countries to quite a large extent . It is remarkable 
that their share is the highest in Ireland, which used to be a sending country 
before joining the EU . Similarly, Italy and Spain have recently become important 
destination countries, although, as mentioned before, due to large inflows from 
non-European countries East-Europeans have contributed to this to a lesser 
extent than in the case of Ireland .
6 Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Census 2006 Non-Irish Nationals Living in Ireland . June, 
2008, Dublin http://www .cso .ie/census/Non-Irish%20Nationals .htm
7 Although strict comparability of Irish data could be questionable because they are derived from 
national statistics and concern the 4th quarter only, in the order of magnitude there should not be 
a major difference .
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The effects of restrictions on employment of East-European labour is also 
clear from the table: despite their traditionally large inflow into Germany and 
Austria, their share is lower than either in Ireland or in the UK . The heritage 
of mainly the large guestworker programmes of the 50s and 60s, however, is 
reflected in the high share of non-EU nationals .
As mentioned, UK is a major host country also of East-European workers, 
where, according to the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS)8, since 2004 a 
total of almost 900 thousand persons from these countries have registered to 
work9 . (See Table 2 below) . Therefore, it is worth to have a closer look at trends 
of registrations within the UK .
The numbers of registrations reflect similar country pattern mentioned 
above, namely that workers from Poland, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania are 
overrepresented. Almost four fifth (79%) of all approved applications originate 
from these four countries out of the eight which joined the EU in 2004 . At the 
same time, there are quite wide fluctuations by years in case of Latvia, Estonia 
and Poland . Whereas in the former two incidental effects may be at work, in 
the case of Poland increasing role of network migration seems likely . Out of 
the overrepresented four countries the special case of Lithuania has already 
been mentioned, but it is worth emphasising that unemployment rate stood 
at a high level, 11% even in the year of accession, 2004 . Although since then 
the situation has improved (and the number of immigrants has declined), it 
is remarkable that their inflow to the UK alone accounts for almost 1% of 
the total employment in Lithuania (their inflow has been higher in each year 
since the accession than that of Hungarians, which is a much bigger country 
and employment there is 2 .5 higher) . One of the reasons might be that 
unemployment rate in Lithuania was high for a long time, it was two-digit level 
between 1998 and 2004 (ranging between 16.5% and 11.4%) and this caused 
a feeling of instability within the population . The situation is similar in Latvia, 
as are the assumed reasons for high outflow . In the case of Slovakia, inflow 
to the UK did reach 1% of whole employment in the country (or even slightly 
exceeded it) in three consecutive years after accession: in 2005, 2006 and 
2007 . Although labour market performance has improved also in this country 
after accession, unemployment remained on a two-digit level up to 2007 . 
Poles are generally regarded as highly mobile people, but in fact the sheer size 
of its population (close to 40 million) well explains its dominance . In addition, 
unemployment is also high here (it decreased to one digit level, to 9.6 only in 
2007, from a rate of 13 .8% of previous year) . 
Beyond labour market performance, wage differentials clearly provide 
further explanation for the outstanding role of these four countries in labour 
inflow to the UK . As can be seen from A2 Table (in Appendix), 
8 Under this scheme, nationals from EU-8 are allowed to have an access to UK labour market .
9 Until March 2008 from Bulgaria there have been 10,540 and from Romania 22,080 worker 
registration . (Blanchflower et al ., 2008, p . 2) .
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taBle 2: numBer of approved applicantS By nationality in the uk, in each Quarter from 2007 
and By year of application, may 2004 – 2008
Period Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia Total
2004 Total 8 .255 1 .860 3 .620 8 .670 19.275 71 .025 13 .020 160 125 .885
2005 Total 10 .575 2 .560 6 .355 12.960 22.990 127 .325 22 .035 175 204.970
2006 Total 8 .345 1 .475 7 .060 9.490 17 .065 162.495 21 .755 180 227 .875
2007
Q1 1 .825 275 1.965 1 .835 3 .740 35 .800 4 .835 45 50 .320
Q2 1 .800 210 2 .085 1 .635 3.690 37.290 5 .600 40 52 .355
Q3 1.990 275 2 .305 1 .545 3 .715 41.195 6 .235 50 57 .310
Q4 1.900 210 2 .520 1 .275 3 .115 35.975 5 .780 55 50 .820
Total 7 .510 965 8 .800 6 .285 14 .265 150 .255 22 .450 190 210 .800
2008
Q1 1 .735 205 2 .620 1 .450 2 .770 32 .365 5 .450 50 46 .645
Q2 1 .850 245 2 .785 1 .750 3 .105 28 .625 5 .410 60 43 .830
Q3 1 .725 250 2 .650 1 .810 2.980 25 .130 4.590 50 39.185
Q4 1 .205 245 2 .805 1.950 2 .685 16.895 2 .860 40 28 .680
Total 6 .520 945 10 .865 6.960 11 .535 103 .015 18 .310 195 158 .340
Source: Accession Monitoring Report May 2004 - December 2008, A8 countries, Home Office UK 
Border Agency WRS (Worker’s Registration Scheme) .
Note: These figures reflect approved applications and refers to initial applications only (i .e . not 
multiple registrations) .
The most recent inflow data already show the impacts of recession: in the 
first quarter of 2009 the outflow to the UK from most of the countries has 
been at the lowest level since the accession . Decline in Polish and Slovak inflow 
was particularly significant because in both cases it was reduced to one third 
of some previous quarters .
It is understandable that like in case of all migrants, also in case of workers 
a similar pattern of inflow emerges in Ireland (because, as seen below, the 
overwhelming majority of migrants consist of workers) . The data clearly show 
the country’s attractiveness since there is not much difference even in scale of 
the inflow, although the Irish labour market is about 15 times (!) smaller than 
that of the UK10 . Obviously, the main reason for this lies in the fact that the 
long-lasting economic boom in Ireland still prevailed when the accession took 
place in 2004 . The “celtic tiger” effects seem to have faded away, however, 
already by 2007, when the inflow from almost all the new members (EU8) 
declined, especially from the previously important sending countries (Poland, 
Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia) . It is clear that the trend continued also in 2008 . 
(See Table 3 . below) . 
10 Total employment in Ireland amounted to 2116 thousand, whereas the respective figure stood at 
31547 thousand in the UK (Source: European Commission, 2008, Employment in Europe, http://
ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=119&langId=en (accessed on December 15, 2008) .
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taBle 3: numBer of central and eaStern european applicantS to whom perSonal puBlic Service 
(ppS) numBerS * are allocated in ireland By nationality (2000-2008)
Country of origin 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Bulgaria 160 512 427 374 104 98 267 1008 772 3722
Czech R. 641 1428 1144 831 3298 4505 4458 3838 2762 22905
Estonia 212 858 463 546 1788 2011 1407 648 572 8505
Hungary 167 511 259 185 1839 3086 4330 5046 4562 19985
Latvia 1046 3023 1538 1230 6266 9328 7954 4674 3727 38786
Lithuania 642 2735 2782 2379 12817 18717 16039 10728 6443 73282
Poland 570 2259 2649 3828 27295 64731 93787 79816 42554 317489
Romania 920 2416 2667 1387 591 813 3336 14525 6752 33407
Slovakia 111 328 252 248 5187 9258 10687 8375 4994 39440
Slovenia 3 1 2 7 64 76 101 63 87 404
Total 4472 14071 12183 11015 59249 112623 142366 128721 73225 4472
Source: Department of Social and Family Affairs, Statistics on the Number issued http://www .welfare .
ie/EN/Topics/PPSN/Pages/ppsn_all_month08 .aspx (access: 12th of June, 2009).
Note :*The only precondition for getting these numbers is to have a permanent residence in Ireland . 
The PPS number is a prerequisite for getting a job in Ireland .
So the data suggest an exceptionally high absorbing capacity, confirming 
conclusions of some researchers, who argue that “immigration to Ireland is 
primarily demand-driven” (Zaiceva et al ., 2008) . In light of the recent financial 
crisis, however, this is most likely to change in the future and its signs are already 
visible . It remains to be seen whether this will lead to large scale return migration11, 
or the inflow would largely decline (depending, of course, how long the recession 
in Ireland and other members would last and how deep it would be) .
2 .2 . patternS and characteriSticS of miGrantS from eaSt-european new 
memBerS
One of the most important characteristics of those persons who came from 
the East-European new members is that most of them are at work . Research 
based on UK data shows that compared with natives, those, who came from 
the ten new East-European members after accession have an even higher 
probability to work than those who arrived pre-accession (although the latter 
group also had a higher probability than natives –see: Blanchflower, 2008:6) .
The pattern of the East-European labour flow is basically similar to the 
one generally characteristic to labour migration . Both the British and the Irish 
data confirm that the most typical migrant is male, young (in their twenties) 
11 The Irish media reported of large scale return migration over the second half of 2008 (according to 
some rumours, about 200 thousand Poles returned home, but in light of the data, this figure seems 
largely overestimated) . 
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and well educated . In the UK, according to WRS, the majority are young: 43% 
fall within the age bracket of 18-24 and 39% ages 25-34. More than half are 
males, i .e . 57 .4% . Both Labour Force Survey data and another survey show 
that they are highly educated . According to results of the former, average 
age of finishing full time education for all East-European migrants, including 
Romanians and Bulgarians, stood at 20 .1, compared with only 17 .6 for natives . 
Another survey for the 8 new East-European members concluded that almost 
30% had a university degree and a further 22% had an under-graduate level 
qualification (Blanchflower et al ., 2008, p . 4) .  . The Irish data show the whole 
population (so it is not directly comparable with the British data), according to 
which majority (close to 70%) has secondary education and a further about 
28% had tertiary . The three largest East-European nationalities, belonging to 
the top ten non-Irish nationalities (i .e . Poles, Lithuanians and Latvians), have 
also similar characteristics to the aforementioned data of the UK12 .  
Employment by sectors also shows a similar pattern to migrant labour in 
general, although in Ireland share of those Latvians who are employed in 
agriculture is very high, being 10% (see table 4) . 13 This is, however, clearly 
an exception because East-European nationals are employed in the following 
sectors: hotels and restaurants, construction, wholesale and retail, manufacturing 
and business services (real estate, renting) . This pattern follows very closely 
those where other foreign nationals are employed, although in Ireland, there is 
one notable exception: East-European labour is clearly underrepresented in the 
health and social work sector (their share does not reach 3%, whereas shares 
of each other group of foreigners, including the UK nationals, well exceeds this, 
not mentioning the third country nationals where in most cases this share well 
exceeds 11%) . So the sectoral pattern of East-European labour is very different 
from that of the total employment, which is illustrated in Table 4 .
taBle 4: top five SectorS where latvianS, lithuanianS and poleS* were employed in ireland, 
2006 (numBer of employeeS and Share in their total employment)
Sectors
Latvians Lithuanians Poles Total
Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons %
Construction 1 804 20 3 592 23 10 122 22 265 200 13
Manufacturing 1 877 21 3 346 21 10 095 22 290 700 14
Wholesale and retail 1 621 18 2 918 18 7 661 17 283 400 14
Hotels and restaurants 1 181 13 2 133 14 7 314 16 122 800 6
Business services … … 1 230 8 4 332 9  . . .  . .
Agriculture, forestry or fisheries 891 10 … … … . … . 113 200 6
Source: CSO, Census, 2006 . and Foreign Nationals: PPSN Allocations and Employment in 2007, 
CSO .
Note: *These are nationalities which belonged to the top ten of non-Irish nationals in 2006 .
12 For example, in 2006 in Ireland the male/female ratio of Lithuanians was 56:44, their average age 
was 27 .7 years only, almost 25% of their working-age population –those above the age of 15– had 
tertiary education and 80% at least secondary –source: CSO, Census, 2006 . 
13 Only 2 .2% of foreign nationals are working in the sector (CSO, Ireland) .
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In the UK, sectoral composition does not differ too much, although at first 
sight, it seems, as if the biggest sector would have been administration, business 
& management. This is, however, due purely to statistical reasons, since the 
majority of workers in the sector are actually employed by recruitment agencies 
who could actually be employed by a variety of sectors14 . Nevertheless, data 
in Table 5 could be regarded as indicative and shows strong resemblance to 
the Irish pattern . The only notable difference is the relative importance of the 
health and medical sector, which has much lower weight in Ireland . (Here this 
sector employs rather other nationalities than Central and East-Europeans, 
mainly non-Europeans who are dominating it15, having a share of 20 .8 as 
opposed to 10 .8% of Irish, 11 .8% of UK, and the new members have a mere 
2 .4% share – see: CSO, Census, 2006) .
taBle 5: top ten SectorS where citizenS of eaSt-european new memBerS work in the uk, Between 
may 2004 and SeptemBer 2008 (cumulative total)
Czech Rep. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia Total
Administration, 
business and 
management
12 .255 2.295 9.575 16 .075 30 .335 240 .265 42 .205 200 353 .215
Hospitality and 
catering
10 .265 1 .520 11 .085 5.295 12 .335 105.955 19.325 215 165.995
Agriculture 2 .630 780 1 .210 10 .020 16 .150 53 .560 6 .075 15 90.440
Manufacturing 2 .535 700 1 .440 3 .245 6 .060 43.990 5 .765 50 63 .785
Food/fish/meat 
processing
1 .455 25 610 2 .775 5 .000 28 .470 4 .070 15 42 .820
Retail 2 .010 365 1 .765 1.095 2 .700 26 .570 3.970 75 38 .550
Health and 
medical
2 .470 470 2 .075 700 2 .080 25 .320 4 .155 60 37 .325
Construction 
and land
1 .440 220 1 .205 1 .185 3.295 25 .680 2 .625 25 35 .685
Transport 1.090 200 1 .125 355 1 .115 17 .750 1 .270 20 22.920
Entertainment 
and leisure
1.190 175 1 .155 515 975 7 .750 1 .585 25 13 .370
Total in Top 10 
sectors
37.340 7.160 31.240 41.255 80.045 575.310 91.045 705 864.110
Other 
ocupations
/not stated
2 .450 335 2 .400 875 1.925 19.195 3 .140 150 30 .480
Source: WRS .
Note: The table shows registered workers, not the number of applications made . The figures reflect 
initial applications only (not multiple registration, made by individuals aiming to work with more than 
one employer simultaneously, or re-registration where an individual has changed employers) .
14 The overwhelming majority of them works for temporary employment agencies, which is confirmed 
by WRS data . According to them their share is as high as 53% (Blanchflower et al ., 2008) . 
15 For example, not less than 29% of Nigerian workers, who also belong to top ten non-Irish 
nationalities, can be found in this sector (Source: CSO Census, 2006) . 
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In contrast to their high educational level, workers from the new member 
CEECs tend to work longer hours and are paid lower wages (there is ample 
evidence for this in the UK – see: Blanchflower, 2008:7-8) . The Irish data show 
that even compared to other non-Irish nationals, they are those who have the 
highest share of working as unskilled workers (around 10%) . Many of them are 
semi-skilled or skilled manual workers . It has to be noted that in all other non-
Irish nationality groups the majority works either in managerial positions, or 
as professionals, or as non-manual workers . For East-Europeans, however, this 
figure is only around 25% (and out of this, the majority work as non-manual 
workers, for example in the case of Poles, this figures stands at 23%) .
3 . key motiveS and other impactS on miGration deciSionS
Reasons for propensity to migrate and migration itself are very complex 
and there is a vast literature dealing in details with this topic partly from a 
theoretical perspective, partly analysing evidence (i .e . case studies or using 
econometric models) . This is obviously a very important topic from a policy point 
of view, and information is needed not only about factors generating migration 
intentions, but also on those factors which lead to realising them . Migration 
intentions in various European countries have been analysed recently by many 
papers which rely “on a high correlation between migration intentions and their 
realisations” . Other studies found, however, that “intentions data provide very 
valuable information, but are only imperfectly correlated with future behaviour 
and have to be treated with caution”16 . Reasons for the disagreement could lie 
in the fact that those circumstances which influence realisation vary to a large 
extent, depending on the countries involved (both home and host countries), 
on economic climate, the type of migration (economic vs . political) and many 
other things . 
One can draw conclusions about key motives and determinants of 
migration from the composition of migrants . It is clear from the above 
analysis for example, that the main objective of the overwhelming majority 
of migrants from the East-European new members is to work in the host 
country concerned and this points to mainly economic motives . This is 
understandable in light of the high income differentials, expressed for 
example in their GDP per capita . It would be important, however, to know 
what explains the differences in scale of outmigration from these countries . 
For example, due to the sheer size of its population, it is understandable that 
Poles dominate the outflow of East-Europeans . Even the fact that they are 
overrepresented can be easily explained by their high migration propensity 
(migration history) and the well known network effects . Large inflow from the 
two Baltic states, Lithuania and Latvia is less clear . It is also an open question 
why relatively many persons from Slovakia take up a job abroad (not only in 
16 See: Zaiceva et al ., 2008, p . 7 . and see a list of the referred papers there .
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the neighbouring Czech Republic) . These cases are all the more interesting, 
because there have been rapid growth in these countries recently . Slovakia 
was even regarded as a success story over the last few years, and it even 
managed to meet the Maastricht criteria and therefore to introduce the euro 
in 2009. Despite this, unemployment stood at one of the highest levels until 
recently (Poland had similar level) . Apart from a lack of available jobs, highly 
educated young people may find insufficient opportunity for their career 
advancement (although the country attracted a large inflow of foreign capital 
recently, they might not offer such jobs which would provide them with 
sufficiently promising opportunities) .
Although it is clear that outflow was large from those countries where 
unemployment stood at the highest level, besides macroeconomic conditions, 
people’s own perceptions also matter (and they could be different from what 
the macro-data would suggest) . For example, in 2005 although unemployment 
was higher in Poland than in Lithuania, there was not much difference in 
how people evaluated the prospects of their own jobs: for the statement, 
“I might lose my job in the next six months”, 26 .5% of Polish respondents 
answered positively, whereas this figure was just 3 .2 percentage lower for 
Lithuanians (i .e . 22 .3%) . In fact, there was a large difference in answering this 
question positively: whereas only 11 .3% of EU-citizens did that, the figure 
was definitely above 20% for the 10 East-European new members countries . 
According to results of this survey17, job satisfaction is also lower in these 
countries . 
Further investigations would be needed to explain high outflow from 
the two Baltic states, but the fact that life satisfaction is among the lowest 
in these countries, might also give us some hint at least (see results of a 
recent survey in Appendix, Figure A1 ., as an example, but other surveys, like 
Eurobarometer carried out also in 2007, basically confirm these findings – 
see in Blanchflower, 2008) . Although there are other countries where life 
satisfaction is even lower (Bulgaria and Hungary), other factors in Lithuania 
and Latvia may also play an important role in generating high outflow18 . It has 
to be added that the level of life satisfaction is certainly relevant when key 
motives are examined, shown also by the example of Bulgaria (outmigration 
was particularly large from this country over the last few years, even well 
before the accession) . In addition, in case of workers, satisfaction with salary 
is certainly an important element when life satisfaction is rated . This element 
was found as significant . In case of citizens of the new member states both 
before and after enlargement (see: Zaiceva, 2008. p. 9). As regards household 
17 Source: European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) 2005, Eurofound . The EWCS asked about 
working conditions . Results of Eurobarometer carried out also in 2005 (see: Blanchflower, 2008 ., 
ibid) also confirmed these findings . 
18 It is a relevant question for example, what rapid GDP growth really meant for these countries, 
whether this was a signal of a real, unusually quick catching up process, or rather other factors were 
at play, producing misleading statistical figures . 
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income, a survey of 2007 found that it is the lowest precisely in those new 
members from where outflow is significant19 . 
As mentioned, knowledge of languages plays certainly an important role in 
motives and selection of destination countries . Young generation in Central and 
Eastern Europe mostly speak English20 and this could also explain “migration 
diversion” towards the UK and Ireland (but restrictions by Germany and 
Austria the traditional host countries of East-Europeans, where 60% of NMS 
8 migrants went in before the accession, have certainly contributed also to 
the diversion) . It is also clear that the emergence of budget airlines reduced 
the costs migration, making more frequent family contacts less expensive 
(this even led to a relative decline in the significance of geographical distance 
within Europe; although role of this development should not be overestimated 
because other important factors are also a play, it could open new perspectives 
towards higher mobility in the ‘old continent’) . At the same time, experiences 
of the free flow of East-European labour so far seem to confirm the importance 
of languages, especially the costs of investment in learning them, which is 
illustrated for example by the large inflow of Romanians to Spain or Italy (their 
native language is also Latin and for Romanians learning Spanish or Italian 
would certainly require much less effort than another non-Latin European 
language) . In addition, it is interesting that although Sweden has been pursuing 
a liberal policy towards East-European labour since the accession, it has not 
proved a popular destination (neither have other Scandinavian countries21, or 
the Netherlands) . 
4 . concluSionS: poSSiBle impactS and policy implicationS
The literature on this specific issue (i .e . impacts of East-European labour) 
has a consensus that major impact on overall labour market outcomes cannot 
be found . For example, as regards the impacts on the UK labour market, some 
authors say that the least skilled could be affected, if there is any impact at 
all . They found “a small negative relationship between the change in the annual 
rate of wage inflation of those in elementary occupations…between 2005 and 
2006 and the change in the share of A8 workers one year earlier…” . Other 
authors found the same (i .e . also a small negative relationship), but in the 
case of the semi-skilled and the unskilled services sector (Blanchflower et al ., 
2008:12) .
19 Mean equalised household income (which means that different sizes and compositions of 
households can be compared and they are measured in PPS) . Ranking of countries according to this 
is the following: Bulgaria (lowest), Romania, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia . Source: EQLS, 
Eurofound, 2008 .
20 A factor which is emphasised also by Zaiceva et al . 2008, and Blanchflower at al ., 2008 .
21 There is only one exception, but this also confirms the importance of languages: for Estonians, 
Finland seems to be a preferred destination (this might explain their much lower inflow than that of 
citizens of other Baltic states to the UK, for example) . 
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As regards unemployment, although there was a coincidence between 
substantial increase in inflow from NMS, and rising unemployment, one of the 
authors who examined the issue found no statistically significant link between 
increased migration and the rise in the number of claimants for unemployment 
benefit22 .
Similarly, research on Irish data concluded that the immigration between 
2003 and 2005 was primarily demand-driven which has not generated 
“displacement effects on the aggregate level” (Zaiceva et al ., 2008, p . 6) . It can 
be assumed that in other countries the inflow of Eastern European labour during 
the first years of enlargement was also mainly demand-driven: an indirect proof 
for this is that, in their model, based on Eurobarometer 2006 data, Zaiceva et 
al . found that unemployed people did not find migration as an important issue 
(see: Zaiceva, ibid) . This might again point to lack of displacement effects .
From policy perspectives (especially at EU level) the most interesting and 
relevant question is what the impacts of the transitional arrangements are, 
whether a restrictive and selective immigration policy makes sense nowadays 
in intra-EU labour flow . By now, in principle, this should have become a topical 
issue because this year, 2009 marks the end of restrictions without justifying 
labour market disturbances . In reality, however, as a direct consequence of the 
current crisis, it is not difficult to prove the presence of these disturbances . 
There is already some evidence for this . For example, although the Migration 
Advisory Committe in the UK recognised that the impact of lifting restrictions 
on employment of nationals from Bulgaria and Romania “would be small, but 
the risks to the labour market are mainly on the downside” . In a later report (in 
April 2009) their conclusion, “the UK labour market is seriously disturbed”23, 
was supported by some data . 
As mentioned above, host country economies have not been adversely 
affected by the East-European inflow . Therefore it is relevant to ask whether 
those countries which applied restrictions have benefited from “migration 
diversion”, and whether the restrictions helped to achieve their objectives . 
Although overall it is difficult to assess it (for this, a counter-factual analysis 
would have been needed), the available evidence shows that in the UK presence 
of high skilled labour from Eastern Europe has become more pronounced 
than in Germany (see Zaiceva, 2008, p .10) . It seems likely that this is the 
consequence of the UK’s liberal policy, presumably because workers from the 
new members could take up such skilled jobs, which they are unable to occupy 
in Germany due to the restrictions (these jobs may not require very high 
and specific skills but they prove useful in helping to accumulate substantial 
human capital by enabling workers to gain considerable experience in host 
country labour market which could lead to fill in more high skilled jobs in 
large demand) . Although in principle when the restrictions are lifted, the 
‘balance’ could be restored, i .e . more high skilled people could be attracted 
22 Gilpin et al ., 2006 is quoted both in Blanchflower et al ., 2008 and Zaiceva et al ., 2008 .
23 See: MAC (2008), p.131. and MAC (2009) p. 6.
43
reviSta de economía mundial 22, 2009, 27-50
trendS and reaSonS for eaSt-european laBour miGration to ireland and the uk in the firSt yearS of enlarGement
also to Germany, network effects are important, so this process might be 
relatively slow . 
An important issue is what could be the more indirect impacts of the recent 
financial crisis (not only direct effects on migration policy) . There are already 
strong signs of much less demand in the most important host countries (Ireland, 
UK) . It remains to be seen, however, whether more return migration would occur 
or the majority of current migrants follow another strategy, for example they 
move to another destination . (Return migration in a large scale seems quite 
unlikely since situation in home countries could turn to even worse than in host 
economies) . At the same time, as a consequence of allowing free movement in 
more countries, the destination countries could be more diversified (though, as 
mentioned, language barriers could restrict this) . Although some diversification 
can already be seen, (on the example of Romanians’ high inflow to Spain, and 
Italy), it is an important question what would happen if liberalisation is slowing 
down or even some (further) restrictions would be (re)introduced (there have 
already been attempts for applying restrictions for example in Italy –in case of 
a protracted, deep recesssion its probability could increase) .
Composition of migrants could also be expected to change . High skilled 
workers (mainly with specific skills) may remain, but those with less skill have 
to leave . Again, the pace of this process will depend on the economic climate . 
If there is no quick recovery from the current economic downturn, less new 
migrants will come (which can be observed already, as shown in the paper) and 
the younger ones will return or migrate elsewhere .
It is difficult to predict even the order of magnitude of future migration 
because there are too many factors (including unforeseeable events, like 
the current financial crisis) influencing the actual inflow . Although general 
determinants of migration are well known from experience and the literature, 
if migration potential of so many countries are examined, there could always 
be ‘outliers’, due mainly to their very specific conditions, therefore they 
could behave in an unpredictable way . For example, whereas strong impacts 
of migrants’ network on increase of migration are well documented, and 
this could explain the constantly high Polish inflow, much less is known of 
those specific conditions which Lithuania, and to a lesser extent also Latvia, 
Slovakia, have . In order to inform policy (mainly to establish whether short-
term or longer term effects are at work), it would be important to explore 
these conditions .
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trendS and reaSonS for eaSt-european laBour miGration to ireland and the uk in the firSt yearS of enlarGement
taBle a2: relative income level in a8 countrieS, aS compared to the uk Between 2004 and 
2008 (purchaSinG power Standard, uk=100)
GDP per capita by year
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
United Kingdom 100 100 100 100 100
Czech Republic 60 .8 62 .3 64 .3 67 .3 69.8
Estonia 46 .3 50 .2 54 .2 57 .0 56 .1
Latvia 37 .0 39.9 43 .6 48 .6 48 .2
Lithuania 40.9 43 .4 46 .1 49.9 51.9
Hungary 51 .1 51.9 52 .8 52 .5 53 .2
Poland 41 .0 42 .1 43 .2 44 .8 47 .0
Slovenia 70 .0 71 .8 72 .8 74.9 77 .3
Slovakia 46 .2 49.4 52 .7 56 .2 59.8
A8 average
(weighted by
population)
47 .4 48 .8 50 .4 52 .2 54 .1
Source: Eurostat, 2009. Quoted in: MAC, 2009, p. 39.
klára fóti
ta
B
le
 a
3
: n
at
io
n
a
l 
in
Su
r
a
n
c
e 
n
u
m
B
er
 r
eG
iS
tr
at
io
n
S 
to
 a
d
u
lt
 f
o
r
ei
G
n
 n
at
io
n
a
lS
 f
r
o
m
 t
h
e 
n
ew
 
m
em
B
er
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
S 
(n
m
S1
2
), 
By
 Q
u
a
rt
er
 o
f 
r
eG
iS
tr
at
io
n
S 
a
n
d
 n
at
io
n
a
li
ty
 (t
h
o
u
Sa
n
d
S)
A
ll
M
al
ta
R
ep
 o
f E
st
on
ia
R
ep
 o
f L
at
vi
a
R
ep
 o
f L
ith
ua
ni
a
B
ul
ga
ri
a
H
un
ga
ry
Po
la
nd
R
om
an
ia
C
yp
ru
s
R
ep
 o
f S
lo
ve
ni
a
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
Sl
ov
ak
 R
ep
Ja
n 
0
2
 - 
M
ar
 0
2
3
,6
4
0
,0
7
0
,0
4
0
,0
7
0
,3
0
0,
90
0
,1
7
1
,0
7
0
,3
6
0
,1
0
0
,0
7
0
,2
6
0
,2
3
A
pr
 0
2
 - 
Ju
n 
0
2
2
,9
5
0
,0
2
0
,0
3
0
,0
5
0
,2
3
0
,7
8
0
,1
2
0,
90
0
,3
5
0
,0
7
0
,0
4
0,
19
0
,1
6
Ju
l 0
2
 - 
Se
pt
 0
2
4
,6
2
0
,0
6
0
,0
5
0
,1
0
0
,4
5
1
,1
1
0
,2
1
1
,4
8
0
,4
5
0
,0
8
0
,0
7
0,
29
0
,2
6
O
ct
 0
2
 - 
D
ec
 0
2
4
,1
2
0
,0
7
0
,0
4
0
,1
2
0
,4
4
0,
92
0
,1
8
1,
29
0
,4
1
0
,0
7
0
,0
5
0
,3
1
0
,2
3
Ja
n 
0
3
 - 
M
ar
 0
3
5
,9
8
0
,0
5
0
,0
5
0
,1
4
0,
69
1
,1
4
0
,2
2
2
,2
2
0
,6
4
0,
09
0
,0
6
0
,3
6
0
,3
2
A
pr
 0
3
 - 
Ju
n 
0
3
4
,8
3
0
,0
3
0
,0
3
0
,1
0
0
,5
5
0,
90
0
,1
7
1
,8
8
0
,5
5
0
,0
5
0
,0
5
0
,2
4
0
,2
8
Ju
l 0
3
 - 
Se
pt
 0
3
6
,9
7
0
,0
6
0
,0
5
0
,1
5
0,
97
1
,1
7
0
,2
1
2
,8
6
0
,7
4
0
,0
8
0
,0
5
0
,2
8
0
,3
4
O
ct
 0
3
 - 
D
ec
 0
3
6
,5
7
0
,0
7
0
,0
6
0,
1
9
0,
93
1
,1
2
0
,2
5
2
,5
2
0
,7
0
0
,0
8
0
,0
4
0,
29
0
,3
3
Ja
n 
0
4
 - 
M
ar
 0
4
10
,3
5
0
,0
6
0
,0
9
0,
2
9
1
,3
8
2
,0
0
0
,3
6
4
,0
0
1
,1
7
0,
09
0
,0
8
0
,3
7
0
,4
7
A
pr
 0
4
 - 
Ju
n 
0
4
11
,9
2
0
,0
8
0
,1
2
0
,4
5
1
,7
2
1
,6
4
0
,3
7
4,
97
1
,0
1
0
,1
0
0
,2
1
0
,5
5
0
,7
0
Ju
l 0
4
 - 
Se
pt
 0
4
2
3
,5
8
0
,1
3
0
,3
4
1,
2
9
3
,1
0
1
,0
8
0
,7
1
11
,9
6
0
,6
8
0
,1
7
0
,1
8
1
,5
4
2
,4
0
O
ct
 0
4
 - 
D
ec
 0
4
3
3
,1
3
0
,1
2
0
,5
0
1
,6
7
4
,5
2
1
,0
0
1
,1
2
1
7
,5
1
0
,7
6
0
,2
2
0
,2
0
2
,2
1
3
,2
8
Ja
n 
0
5
 - 
M
ar
 0
5
4
8
,2
1
0
,1
4
0
,7
3
2,
91
6
,2
1
0
,8
0
1
,6
1
2
6
,6
8
0
,8
4
0,
29
0
,2
2
3
,0
6
4
,7
3
A
pr
 0
5
 - 
Ju
n 
0
5
5
7
,5
6
0
,1
3
0
,7
5
3
,6
3
7
,7
4
0,
89
1
,8
3
3
2
,2
1
0
,7
0
0
,2
6
0
,1
5
3
,1
7
6
,1
0
Ju
l 0
5
 - 
Se
pt
 0
5
71
,9
8
0
,1
6
0
,8
9
3
,7
6
8
,2
0
0
,8
5
1,
99
44
,1
9
0
,8
2
0
,2
3
0
,1
2
3
,5
1
7
,2
7
O
ct
 0
5
 - 
D
ec
 0
5
6
6
,3
8
0
,1
7
0
,6
3
3
,2
0
6,
95
0
,5
7
2
,2
7
41
,6
6
0
,6
4
0,
29
0,
09
3,
29
6
,6
1
Ja
n 
0
6
 - 
M
ar
 0
6
8
0
,7
7
0
,1
6
0
,7
6
3
,8
0
8
,0
5
0
,5
2
2
,4
8
5
3
,0
2
0
,7
2
0
,3
3
0
,1
3
3
,2
8
7
,5
3
A
pr
 0
6
 - 
Ju
n 
0
6
5
7
,6
2
0
,1
1
0
,4
6
2
,5
8
5
,2
5
0
,4
5
1
,8
7
38
,1
9
0
,5
4
0
,2
1
0
,1
2
2
,3
0
5
,5
3
Ju
l 0
6
 - 
Se
pt
 0
6
70
,7
7
0
,1
3
0
,4
2
2
,5
1
5
,4
4
0
,4
1
2
,0
6
49
,7
0
0
,5
6
0,
19
0
,1
0
2
,6
2
6
,6
2
O
ct
 0
6
 - 
D
ec
 0
6
7
3
,3
6
0
,1
8
0
,5
2
2
,5
3
5
,4
6
0
,5
6
2
,5
1
51
,3
0
0
,6
1
0
,2
7
0
,1
1
2
,7
6
6
,5
5
Ja
n 
07
 - 
M
ar
 0
7
11
5
,7
5
0
,2
3
0
,6
5
3
,4
1
7
,7
6
1
,4
3
4
,3
0
81
,2
4
2
,2
6
0,
39
0
,2
0
3,
97
9,
91
A
pr
 0
7
 - 
Ju
n 
07
7
5
,9
8
0
,1
2
0
,3
5
2
,1
2
4
,8
4
2,
96
2
,8
5
4
8
,0
5
5
,5
3
0
,2
2
0
,1
0
2
,4
7
6
,3
7
Ju
l 0
7
 - 
Se
pt
 0
7
9
7
,2
7
0
,1
7
0
,3
5
2
,0
0
5
,0
4
5
,0
5
3
,1
3
6
3
,3
7
6
,2
7
0
,2
1
0
,1
5
3
,1
4
8
,4
0
O
ct
 0
7
 - 
D
ec
 0
7
7
8
,8
5
0
,1
6
0
,3
2
1,
7
9
4,
59
2
,8
1
3,
59
49
,8
8
5
,1
1
0
,3
3
0
,1
3
2
,7
2
7
,4
1
Ja
n 
0
8
 - 
M
ar
 0
8
8
0
,3
3
0
,1
4
0
,3
5
1
,8
8
4
,5
5
3
,1
4
3
,7
4
49
,3
7
6
,0
5
0
,3
4
0
,1
6
2
,8
1
7
,8
2
A
pr
 0
8
 - 
Ju
n 
0
8
7
3
,1
6
0
,1
3
0
,3
6
2
,0
5
4
,2
1
4
,4
2
3
,8
2
4
0
,7
5
6
,7
3
0
,3
0
0
,1
4
2
,5
3
7
,7
1
So
ur
ce
: N
at
io
na
l I
ns
ur
an
ce
 R
ec
or
di
ng
 S
ys
te
m
 (h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
 .d
w
p .
go
v .
uk
/a
sd
/t
ab
to
ol
 .a
sp
) .
49
fi
G
u
r
e 
a
1
: l
if
e 
Sa
ti
Sf
a
ct
io
n
 in
d
ex
 B
y 
eu
 2
7
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
S 
a
n
d
 c
o
u
n
tr
y 
G
r
o
u
p
S 
(2
0
07
)
6.
9
7.
5
5
7
6.
6
7.
2
8.
5
6.
7
6.
6
7.
3
8.
2
7.
3
5.
6
7.
6
6.
6
6.
3
7.
9
6
7.
6
7.
9
6.
9
6.
2
6.
5
8.
3
7.
2
6.
7
7.
3
7.
2
6.
5
7
0123456789 Au
str
ia Be
lgiu
m Bu
lga
ria C
yp
rus
Cz
ec
h R
ep
ub
lic Ge
rm
an
y De
nm
ark
Es
ton
ia G
ree
ce
Sp
ain
Fin
lan
d F
ran
ce Hu
ng
ary
Ire
lan
d
Ita
ly Lit
hu
an
ia
Lu
xe
mb
ou
rg
La
tvia
Ma
lta
Ne
the
rla
nd
s P
ola
nd P
ort
ug
al Ro
ma
nia S
we
de
n Slo
ve
nia S
lov
ak
ia
Un
ite
d K
ing
do
m
EU
15
NM
S1
2
EU
27
So
ur
ce
: E
ur
op
ea
n 
Q
ua
lit
y 
of
 L
ife
 S
ur
ve
y 
(E
Q
LS
) 2
0
07
, h
tt
p:
//w
w
w
 .e
ur
of
ou
nd
 .e
ur
op
a .
eu
/a
re
as
/q
ua
lit
yo
fli
fe
/e
ql
s/
eq
ls
2
0
07
/r
es
ul
ts
 .h
tm
 (a
cc
es
s:
 D
ec
em
be
r 
1
5
, 2
0
0
8
) .
Q
ue
st
io
n 
2
9
: A
ll 
th
in
gs
 c
on
si
de
re
d,
 h
ow
 s
at
is
fie
d 
w
ou
ld
 y
ou
 s
ay
 y
ou
 a
re
 w
ith
 y
ou
r 
lif
e 
th
es
e 
da
ys
? 
Sc
al
e 
fr
om
 1
 (‘
ve
ry
 d
is
sa
tis
fie
d’
) t
o 
10
 (‘
ve
ry
 s
at
is
fie
d’
).
